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The use of different currencies in the invoicing of international trade transactions plays a major role
in the international transmission of economic fluctuations. Existing studies argue that an exporter’s
invoicing choice reflects structural aspects of her industry, such as market share and the price-sensitivity
of demand, the hedging of marginal costs, due for instance to the use of imported inputs, and macroeconomic
volatility. We use a new highly disaggregated dataset to assess the roles of the various invoicing determinants.
We find support for the factors identified in the literature, and document a new feature, in the form
of a link between shipments size and invoicing. Specifically, larger transactions are more likely to
be invoiced in the importer’s currency. We offer a potential theoretical explanation for the empirical
link between transaction size and invoicing by allowing invoicing to be set through a bargaining between
exporters and importers, a feature that is absent from existing models despite its empirical relevance.
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1.  Introduction 
 
The currency in which exporters set the price of their goods – the so-called “invoicing” 
currency – has long been recognized as a central aspect of international economics. Specifically, 
it determines who among the exporter or the customer is exposed to exchange rate risk, and 
whether exchange rate fluctuations lead to a switching of demand between goods produced in 
different countries. An extensive theoretical and empirical literature has identified 
complementary drivers of invoicing. A first category reflects structural features of the industry in 
question, such as the price-sensitivity of demand and exporters’ market shares. A second 
category of drivers reflects the need to hedge against unforeseen movements in marginal costs, 
for instance due to exchange rate volatility or the presence of imported inputs priced in foreign 
currencies.
2 In addition to the currencies of the exporter or the importer, the literature has also 
explored the use of “vehicle” currencies that are neither the exporter’s nor the customer’s.
3 
The existing literature suffers from two limitations, one empirical and one theoretical, 
that we address in this paper. On the empirical front, the literature relies mainly on aggregate 
data, potentially hiding contrasting patterns across exporters that might be apparent in more 
disaggregated data.
4 For instance, in a given country firms in an industry where demand is very 
sensitive to prices have an incentive to choose an invoicing currency that is the same as their 
competitors, where firms whose products are more differentiated are less subject to this 
“coalescing” effect (Goldberg and Tille 2008). The existence of such heterogeneity in invoicing 
data would improve our ability to test different theories relative to what is observable in the 
aggregate data. 
We address this limitation by using a new highly disaggregated dataset for Canadian 
imports. Our data cover all Canadian import transactions between February 2002 and February 
2009 (45 million observations), with information on the disaggregated industry, the invoicing 
currency, and the country of origin for each transaction. We begin by documenting the patterns 
of invoicing, both from the point of view of transactions count and the point of view of 
                                                           
2 A non-exhaustive list of recent contributions includes Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Devereux, Engel, and 
Storgaard (2004), Friberg (1998), Novy (2006), Goldberg and Tille (2008). 
3 Goldberg and Tille (2008, 2009). 
4 An exception is Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (forthcoming) who use BLS data to study the frequency of price 
adjustment in U.S. imports and the relationship to currency of invoicing. Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) provide an 
early look at a subsample of Canadian data for an earlier period. Goldberg and Tille (2008) survey other prior 
research.  2 
 
transaction value. The U.S. dollar is extensively used, accounting for nearly 85 percent of import 
invoicing by count (75 percent by value). We distinguish between imports from the United 
States, which account for a little more than half of total imports and are nearly exclusively 
invoiced in U.S. dollar, and imports from other countries where the use of other currencies is 
more substantial. We show that the Canadian dollar is used more extensively for large shipments 
than smaller ones, accounting for a much larger share of imports by value than by count. 
Invoicing patterns are also remarkably steady over time throughout our sample period. 
The drivers of invoicing are then tested through a formal econometric exercise. We 
consider variables that reflect industry-structure (i.e. whether demand is price-sensitive), the 
market share of imports from that country in the specific industry, the size of shipments, the 
reliance on commodity inputs in production, exchange rate volatility, dummy variables that 
capture the ability of various currencies to hedge shocks to marginal costs, and the exchange rate 
regime of the country of origin. Throughout our empirical analysis we distinguish between 
imports from the United States and imports from other countries. 
Our analysis leads to seven main results. First, exporters in industries where demand is 
more price-sensitive tend to use the U.S. dollar (for U.S. exporters) or the Canadian dollar (for 
non-U.S. exporters) relatively more than exporters in other industries. Second, exporters in a 
country which has a dominant share of imports in a particular industry have a greater tendency to 
use their own currency. Third, large shipments have a higher likelihood of being invoiced in 
Canadian dollars than smaller ones, especially when the exporter has a high market share. 
Fourth, exporters in industries with greater use commodity and energy as inputs are more likely 
to invoice in U.S. dollars, reflecting the fact that dollars are the standard invoicing currency for 
these inputs. Fifth, exporters from countries with a volatile exchange rate make little use of their 
currency for invoicing trade. Sixth, we find some evidence of the invoicing use of currencies that 
offer a hedge against movements in production cost. Finally, there is a strong tendency for 
exporters in countries with a peg to the dollar to use the dollar more frequently, whereas 
exporters in euro area countries or with currencies that track the euro closely have a stronger 
tendency to use the euro. 
From a theoretical perspective, the existing literature treats invoicing choice as decided 
solely by the exporter. The only role of the customer is to provide the exporter with the 
downward-sloping demand that the exporters take into account. This assumption of unilateral 3 
 
invoicing is at odds with the evidence provided by Friberg and Wilander (2008). A survey of 
Swedish exporters documents that the invoicing currency is predominantly set through a 
negotiation between the exporter and the consumer. In addition to its lack of empirical realism, 
the standard model is hard pressed to generate the type of link between transaction size and 
invoicing selection that we observe in the data. 
We address this limitation of the theory by developing a model where invoicing is set 
through a bargaining game between the exporter and the customer. We do not claim that this is 
the only setting that could lead to a role of transaction size. Instead we offer it as a way to 
generate this feature through an extension of the standard model.
5 Specifically, the invoicing 
choice is determined as a split between the exporter and the customer of the surplus from the 
transaction and reflects their relative negotiating power. Two main results emerge. First, a 
bargaining allocation is likely to make more use of the destination currency than the unilateral 
invoicing choice by the exporter. Intuitively, the exporter has an incentive to use her own 
currency to limit the impact of exchange rate movements on her unit revenue, whereas the 
customer gets a higher utility from having the price stabilized in her own currency. Second, the 
model implies that the use of the customer’s currency is more pronounced for large sales. This 
reflects the fact that the exporter’s default option is worse when negotiating with a large 
customer, leading her to be more accommodating to the use of destination currency. 
Interestingly, the impact of size on invoicing is more pronounced when the exporter has a large 
bargaining power in splitting the surplus. Intuitively, size represents an alternative source of 
bargaining strength for the customer, which she needs to rely on only if her direct bargaining 
power is limited. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the new invoicing data, 
as well as the measures used in the econometric analysis. The econometric results are analyzed in 
Section 3. Section 4 reviews the invoicing drivers in the standard model, and points to its 
inability of accounting for the observed link between transaction size and invoicing. Section 5 
extends the model by introducing a bargaining dimension. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                           
5 Gopinath and Itskhoki (2009) provide an alternative approach to pricing, pass-through and by extension to invoice 
currency choice by using a dynamic menu-cost model and a variable markup channel generate significant variation 
in the frequency of price adjustment by exporters.  4 
 
Section 2. The invoicing of Canadian imports 
 
A novel database allows for a rich exploration of the various drivers of invoicing. The 
database covers 45 million individual import transactions for Canada, covering all imports 
during 2002 to 2009. 
 
2.1 Sectoral and geographical breakdown 
 
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) records every import transaction into 
Canada.  Each transaction is accompanied by a customs invoice with detailed information on the 
contents’ exporting country of origin, currency of settlement, industry code (up to HS10), 
quantity, and value of transaction.
6  The original dataset, obtained from Statistics Canada 
(StatsCan) in conjunction with CBSA, contained the full roster of 44.5 million import 
transactions spanning the period from February 2002 through February 2009. After observing 
some incomplete sampling in February and March 2002 we drop those months of data and then 
apply other filters to the database: transactions are dropped if there is missing information for 
invoicing currency, industry code, country of origin, or value.  We drop Canadian imports that 
record Canada as the country of origin, since these imports are most likely prior Canadian 
exports being returned to producers, or are goods re-imported for the purpose of repairs. The 
screened sample has 41.9 million observations. Additionally, in our econometric work (described 
below) we introduce variables that are country and time-specific.  For tractability, we limit 
import observations so they are from the group of exporting countries (47) that account for a 
combination of most import transactions by count (covering 95.9 percent) and by value (covering 
97.1 percent). 
Table 1 presents a decomposition of Canadian import transactions into sixteen broad 
product categories, and six exporting regions. This decomposition is based on a count of import 
transactions, without regard to the value of each transaction.  Table 2 provides a more 
conventional decomposition of imports, weighting these by value of transactions. While 
Canadian imports are widely dispersed across exporting countries, the United States is the largest 
partner of Canada by a wide margin, accounting for 59 percent of imports by count and 57 
percent by value. The next-largest import sources for Canada are the eurozone, with 12 percent 
                                                           
6 The Customs Coding form can be referenced at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/forms-formulaires/b3-
3.pdf 5 
 
by count and 9 percent by value, and Asia (both East and South East Asia and China), with 14 
percent by count and 13 percent by value.  
The rightmost column of each of these tables shows the industry composition of Canadian 
imports. Clearly, industry concentration is lower than the concentration by country of origin of 
these imports. The dominant import industries are machinery and equipment (23 percent of 
imports by count and 26 percent by value), metal (13 percent by count, but only 7 percent by 
value), and transportation (only 3 percent by count, but 21 percent by value reflecting the high 
value added of this industry).  
Tables 1 and 2 also show that the presence of particular countries or regions in Canadian 
imports varies by industry. The United States share ranges from a low of 40 percent 
(footwear/headgear by count; or 5 percent by value) to a high of 84 percent for mineral products, 
by count (77 percent for plastics/rubber by value). Eurozone countries are most prevalent in 
Canadian imports of chemicals, leather/furs/hides, and foodstuffs. While Asia accounts for only 
14 percent of total imports (14 percent by count, 13 percent by value), its role is concentrated in 
specific sectors such as textiles (24 percent by count and 45 percent by value), 
footwear/headgear (23 percent by count and 77 percent by value) and leather/furs/hides (22 
percent by count and 59 percent by value). 
 
2.2 A broad assessment of invoicing 
 
What are the broad patterns in the invoicing of Canadian imports? Figure 1 (upper and 
lower panels) presents the evolution of the share of U.S. dollars (USD), Canadian dollars (CAD), 
euros (EUR), and other currencies in invoicing Canadian imports. The upper panel presents 
invoicing shares based on transaction count, with the lower panel showing the shares based on 
transaction value. These figures yield some striking observations. Observe the dominant role of 
the USD which is used on over 85 percent of Canadian import invoices over the period between 
2002 and 2009. This role has also been quite stable over time. The CAD, EUR, and other 
currencies each account for less than 5 percent of Canadian import invoices by count. 
Interestingly, quite a different pattern of currency use emerges in terms of transaction values. 
While the USD remains dominant, its share is lowered to 75 percent of imports. In import value 
comparisons there is a larger role of the CAD, at between 20 and 25 percent of imports. The role 
of the other currencies remains small overall. The larger role of the CAD in terms of value than 6 
 
in terms of count indicates that CAD use is more concentrated among larger transactions, an 
aspect that we explore further below. 
A complementary way to look at the invoicing pattern is to take the point of view of the 
exporter, and consider whether invoicing is done in the exporter’s currency – the so-called 
“producer currency pricing” (PCP) option – in the destination currency – the “local currency 
pricing” (LCP) option – or in a third “vehicle currency” (VCP). Figure 2 presents a window into 
the geographical breakdown of exporter invoicing by showing the use of the PCP option for 
imports from the United States, eurozone, United Kingdom, Japan, China, and all other 
countries, both by count (left panel) and value (right panel). The United States is an outlier with 
PCP being the dominant option. For the eurozone, UK and Japan, the degree of PCP is still 
substantial, and more variable over time, but its use is concentrated in transaction of relatively 
low value as shown by the lower shares in terms of value than in terms of count.  
Figure 3 shows the shares of the three options (PCP, LCP, VCP), with the United States 
exporters presented as distinct from exporters from all other regions.  It is revealing that, in terms 
of transaction counts, local currency pricing is the least prevalent pricing practice by count, 
regardless of whether transactions are for exports from the United States or other regions. PCP is 
the most prevalent form of pricing overall, reflecting both the U.S. exporter use of dollars, as 
well as invoicing in euros by eurozone exporters, yen by Japanese exporters, and pound sterling 
by United Kingdom exporters. For non-U.S. exporter transactions, VCP is the dominant option. 
For all exporters, the USD is the dominant choice. However, the euro also is used on invoices for 
countries in the geographic proximity of the euro area: the euro share in VCP is 23 percent for 
Eastern Europe and the FSU, 19 percent for Switzerland, 14 percent for Scandinavia, and 9 
percent for Britain. A somewhat different invoicing profile especially with respect to PCP and 
LCP appears in terms of value, as the role of PCP shrinks to the benefit of LCP. This again 
reflects a more prominent use of the CAD in large transactions than in small ones. PCP plays 
only a minor role when we focus on non-U.S. exporters, whose exports mostly use a vehicle 
currency for invoicing  or the CAD. 
The data show a novel pattern where invoicing outcomes differ with transaction size. To 
illustrate the magnitude of this pattern, Table 3 provides the prevalence of LCP in the bottom 
95
th percentile and top 5
th percentile of transactions (by size), by industry, and for U.S. and non-
U.S. exporters to Canada. Each panel presents the median transaction size in the bottom 95
th 7 
 
percentile and top 5
th percentile, as well as the shares of LCP. Import transactions in the top 5
th 
percentile are generally substantially larger, and thus unlikely to merely reflect just higher 
quality goods. Larger transactions consistently display a substantially higher LCP share. This 
pattern is robust across industries, and whether one considers all transactions, or the U.S. 
exporters only, or focuses on exporters from the rest of the world. We have conducted formal 
tests using imports disaggregated at the HS2 and HS4 levels, and found consistent patterns of 
statistically higher use of LCP in higher value import transactions. The share of LCP rises as the 
transaction size rises over the upper tail of the distribution of transaction sizes by industry. 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
 
We now turn to a formal assessment of the invoicing patterns in the data. Our 
econometric tests are devised to explore the determinants of invoicing for the full (cleaned) 
sample of Canadian imports described above, about 42 million observations. The dependent 
variables are dummy variables indicating whether a given transaction is invoiced in the 
producer’s currency (PCP=1, LCP=VCP=0), the destination currency CAD (LCP=1, 
PCP=VCP=0), or a vehicle currency (VCP=1, PCP=LCP=0). The regression specifications are 
multinomial logit, which impose the constraint that the three choice alternatives are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive (the three dummy variables add up to one). We estimate separate 
regressions for Canadian imports from the United States (approximately 25 million observations) 
and for Canadian imports from countries other than the United States (approximately 17 million 
observations).  
 
3.1. Explanatory variables 
 
The range of regression variables introduced in our specifications is intended to span the 
main motives emphasized in the theoretical literature (discussed in section 4). We group these 
motives in six main categories. The first category reflects the tendency for invoicing to coalesce 
in a common currency, a behavior which is likely to be more pronounced in industries with 
homogeneous or highly substitutable goods as sales of these goods are more sensitive to price 
differentials with comparable goods. The second category reflects the relative strength of 
exporters and consumers, which could affect their weight when invoicing is set through 
bargaining (section 5). The third category captures the use of commodity and energy inputs in 8 
 
production. As these inputs tend to be invoiced in USD, we can expect industries with higher 
intensity of use to make more use of the USD in invoicing as a means to hedge against 
fluctuations in production costs. The last three categories of variables are linked to 
macroeconomic volatility. Specifically, we introduce variables that measure exchange rate 
volatility, whether a particular currency offers a hedge against movements in production costs, 
and whether the exchange rate regime of the exporter’s country is a peg. 




i are relevant for the coalescing motive in invoice currency choice. 
They are constructed based on the Rauch Index, and following the discussion in Goldberg 
and Tille (2008), these measures indicate which goods are likely to be characterized by high 
elasticities of substitution.  The Rauch index splits various industries (at the HS4 level) into 
three categories: reference-priced or exchange traded, Walrasian, or differentiated goods. The 
first two categories include goods that highly substitutable with each other, while 
differentiated products, including the bulk of manufacturing, have more limited 
substitutability. The dummy variables Refcon
i and Walrascon
i take the respective values of 1 
if goods are reference-priced or Walrasian (respectively) and zero otherwise, so that 
differentiated goods are the reference category.
7 Exporters of reference-priced and Walrasian 
goods are expected to place a relatively high weight in limiting fluctuations of their price 
relative to that of their competitors, leading invoicing to coalesce around a central currency. 
The HS4 classifications are applied to each import at the level of HS4 industry i. 
  Importsharet
i,e and top5ind
i, reflecting the relative bargaining strength of exporters by 
country  e and importers in each industry i.  Importsharet
i,e is the market share of the 
exporter’s country in Canadian imports of the relevant industry (HS2 category). This variable 
is used to assess whether exporters from countries with a large market share in a particular 
industry are more inclined to invoice in their own currency. Top5ind
i is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the value of the particular export transaction falls in the top 5
th percentile for a 
particular HS4 code, and is zero otherwise. The variables importsharet
i,e and top5ind
i are 
used to proxy for the bargaining power of exporters and importers respectively. We 
acknowledge that these proxies are imperfect. A preferable option would be to determine 
                                                           
7 While the index is originally constructed for SITC codes, we used an SITC-HS concordance to match the 
variables.  Rauch provided a “conservative” and a “liberal” classification, of which we use the conservative index. 9 
 
whether a specific large transaction is associated with a large importer or a large exporter. 
This type of distinction is infeasible in this data set, since we do not have identifiers for 
individual importers or exporters that would enable a link to their specific characteristics that 
could influence behavior.  
  Intensity
i, capturing the role of commodity intensity of production. This variable, constructed 
by HS2 code, represents industry share of commodities such as hydrocarbons and metals in 
total costs, represented by the sum of producer value plus employee compensation. Given 
that the USD is the dominant invoicing currency for these inputs, exporters in an industry 
with higher commodity intensity may have an incentive to invoice in USD to hedge 
movements in their input costs. The data used to construct this measure are assumed common 
across countries and are constructed from the Standard Use Table of the United States 2002 
Benchmark Input-Output tables.
8 While ideally this measure would be constructed for 
exporters in different countries using country-specific I-O tables, we opted to apply the U.S. 
I-O table to all exporting countries because of limited data availability.  
  Coefvart
e, reflecting exchange rate volatility between the exporter’s currency and the CAD. 
As exchange rates are all defined against the CAD, a higher value of this measure indicates 
more volatile macroeconomic fundamentals in the exporter’s country, which may make the 
exporter less likely to invoice in her own currency. The measure is constructed as the 
coefficient of variation (to filter out level effects) of the exporter’s exchange rate over a 
rolling lagged five-year window. The exchange rate data are from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics database (series rf, the period-average nominal exchange rate). 
  USDhedge,  CADhedge,  EURhedge, aimed at capturing the hedging benefits of different 
currencies. As in Goldberg and Tille (2008), this hedging variable takes a value of one if the 
USD, CAD or EUR are (respectively) significantly better currencies for hedging the 
volatility of the exporter’s profits, and are zero otherwise. For instance, the EUR should 
represent a good hedge for an exporter whose cost of production are high in states of the 
world where the EUR appreciates. Constructing these variables entail substantial steps that 
are described in the data appendix.  
                                                           
8 The detailed I-O codes are aggregates of NAICS codes, so we used a concordance between NAICS and HS2 to 
determine commodity shares. Since each NAICS code can map to multiple HS2 codes, we weighted the 
observations by the inverse of the number of codes to which it mapped, so that each NAICS code contributed equal 
weight to the overall construction. 10 
 
  Dollarpeg and Euroarea, reflect exchange rate regimes, namely pegs and monetary union. 
These dummy variables are country and time specific, and indicate whether the exporter’s 
currency is maintaining a dollar peg or is part of the euro area or appears pegged to the euro. 
As the exporter’s currency and the USD (or EUR) are similar options under a credible peg, 
we expect the exporter to be more likely to invoice in USD (or EUR) as transacting in these 
currencies involves smaller transaction costs. The peg classifications come from Ilzetski, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Since these classifications extend only through the end of 2007, 
we applied the end 2007 values to the 2008 and 2009 import transactions. The only country 
outside of the formal euro area included as “euroarea” is Denmark, whose currency closely 
tracked the euro during this sample period.  
 
3.2. Econometric assessment of invoicing 
 
The results of our econometric analysis are reported in Table 4 for imports from non-U.S. 
countries and Table 5 for imports from the United States. The regressions are set up so that 
invoicing options are taken relative to a benchmark, which we take to be the USD in all tables. In 
the case of imports from non-U.S. countries, invoicing in the vehicle currency pricing (VCP) 
option largely corresponds to use of USD, with some euro use by countries near to the euro area. 
The pairs of columns in each numbered regression specification in Table 4 report the influences 
on LCP (invoicing in CAD) or PCP of the variables indicated in the far left column of the table. 
In the case of imports from the United States, invoicing in USD corresponds to the PCP option. 
The results reported in Table 5 show the role of each regressor on the incidence of LCP or VCP 
(invoicing in a currency that is neither the USD nor the CAD).  
The tables report the maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients, with the standard 
errors provided in brackets. For interpretations, it is important to recognize that the coefficient 
estimates are not marginal effects of the variables, which are not constant and would need to be 
constructed conditional on levels of each of the variables in the multinominal logit specification. 
Each table presents regressions focusing on the role of the separate groups of variables 
associated with the six main categories of invoicing motives described above. The final columns 11 
 
of each table integrate the variables into single multinomial logit specifications.
9 Overall, Table 4 
provides results from 10 multinomial logit regression specifications, while Table 5 provides 
results from only 9 specifications since the exchange rate peg variables are excluded. Coefficient 
estimates that are statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level are indicated by * and ** 
respectively. The tables also report the number of observations used in the regressions and the 
AIC statistic. All regressions include time fixed effects to capture common unobserved 
variability by quarter, and have standard errors clustered by month. 
 
3.2.1. Imports from non-U.S. countries 
 
Table 4 presents the results for Canadian imports from countries other than the United 
States, with VCP (invoicing in USD in practice) being the benchmark option. The regression 
specifications show the direction of influence of regressions on the likelihood of choosing PCP 
and LCP (versus VCP). Regression 2 reflects the coalescing motive. Imports from more 
homogeneous sectors, as indicated by values of one for the dummy variables Refcon
i or 
Walrascon
i, have a higher probability of being invoiced in CAD and a lower probability of being 
invoiced in producer’s currencies. This is consistent with a coalescing motive around the 
destination currency, for instance reflecting competition from domestic Canadian firms, or 
around the USD which is the standard invoicing currency in commodities. 
Regression 3 captures the different aspects of the bargaining power of exporters and 
importers. Exporters from a country with a high market share in Canadian imports in the relevant 
industry are less likely to invoice in CAD, as they are in a stronger position vis-à-vis Canadian 
customers. While regression 3 shows a smaller use of the PCP option for high market share 
exporters, this is overturned once we control for other invoicing motives (regression 10). Large 
orders (Top5ind
i=1) are associated with a larger use of the LCP option and a smaller use of PCP. 
One interpretation of these results could be that larger imports are mapped to larger and more 
powerful customers. These transactions are then more likely to be associated with LCP if the 
importers prefer not to bear the exchange rate risk. The interacted terms in the regression show 
the increased use of LCP for large shipments is most pronounced when exporters are from a 
                                                           
9 Differences across the coefficients on the regressors in the dedicated regressions versus the fully integrated 
regressions could occur due to correlations among the regressors in the respective data samples. Appendix Tables 3 
and 4 provide coefficients of variation to suggest where such issues of correlation may arise.   
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country with a large market share. This can be interpreted as showing that the benefits of a high 
market share for an exporter are diminished when there are large customers on the other side of 
the transaction. With the effect of Top5Ind interacted with the mean value of market share 
according to the last regression column, we observe that the overall effect of being large is 
negative whenever exporter market share in a country exceeds about 2 percent.  
Regression 4 captures the effect on invoice currency choice of the commodity intensity of 
production costs at the HS2 industry level. A higher intensity of commodity inputs, which tend 
to be invoiced in USD, reinforces the use of USD in invoicing by reducing the prevalence of 
both PCP and LCP. This variable sheds light on what might be the effects on invoicing of 
imported input use, as countries which import a large share of commodity or other inputs would 
likewise have an incentive to invoice their exports in the same currency as used for those 
imports. 
The role of exchange rate volatility is captured in regression 5. We observe that exporters 
from countries with volatile currencies vis-à-vis the CAD are more likely to use the USD, with a 
reduction in the use of both the LCP and PCP options. This feature is consistent with the 
theoretical finding that invoicing takes place in currencies with more stable fundamentals.  
The hedging motivation for invoicing is captured in regression 6. While the hedging 
variables have some influence on invoicing, the role of these variables remains limited and not 
fully consistent with theoretical priors. First, some of these terms are statistically insignificant 
even in a sample of about 17 million observations. Second, the use of PCP is reduced for all 
three hedge variables. While this is reasonable when the USD or CAD offer hedging benefits, it 
is less clear that hedging benefits from the EUR should reduce PCP, given the large presence of 
eurozone countries in the sample. Hedging benefits from the EUR, however, reduce the use of 
LCP, which is to be expected. Yet, hedging benefits from the CAD do not lead to a larger use of 
the LCP option. When the USD is a better hedging currency, invoicing is weakly tilted towards 
it. Overall, this mixed evidence on the hedging motive can arise either because the theory is not 
fully supported, or because of the challenges in building the hedging measures. It is possible that 
this constructed indicator variable does not appropriately account for the profit correlations that 
enter into producer decisions. 
Regression 7 illustrates the impact of exchange rate regimes, with the findings being 
consistent with theoretical priors. Exporters from countries with a peg to the USD make more 13 
 
use of that currency at the expense of the LCP and VCP options. Exporters from the euro area 
are likely to more frequently use the PCP option. 
3.2.2. Imports from the United States 
 
As previously noted, the vast majority of U.S. imports are invoiced in USD, which 
represents the PCP option for this sample of nearly 25 million exports. Some interesting results 
from Table 5 are that this pattern is reinforced when exported goods are highly homogeneous 
(regression 2) and their production inputs are highly commodity intensive (regression 4). 
Regression 3 shows that the PCP option gains prevalence when the United States 
accounts for a large market share in Canadian imports for the industry in question. Yet, larger 
transactions tend to be associated with more use of the LCP option, especially when the U.S. 
exporter market share is high. These results are consistent with the evidence for non-U.S. 
exporters. Periods of relatively high volatility in the USD-CAD exchange rate are associated 
with larger use of third country currencies (regression 5). Regression 6 shows that our hedging 
variables do not systematically influence invoicing choices by U.S. exporters.
10 
 
3.2.3. Which factors contribute most to invoicing? 
 
While the multinomial logit expressions do not provide a direct variance decomposition 
mapping, we examine the Akaike information criteria (AIC) values
11 to compare explanatory 
power of alternative combinations of regressors. The comparisons of AIC scores across the 
specifications of Tables 4 and 5 are provided in Table 6.  Recall that all specifications have the 
USD as the dominant invoicing currency, so the fits of models are ones that best explain the 
deviations of invoicing from this standard.  
For invoicing of exports from non-US countries, the largest contributors by far are the 
exchange rate regime choices of countries, whether pegging to the USD or if countries are part of 
the euro area. The score comparisons show that the next largest contributors are the hedging 
variables, although it is noteworthy that the role of these variables is likely arising because these 
constructions have EURhedge being 0 for countries pegged to the euro, since the correlation is 
                                                           
10 As shown in Appendix Table 3, the Coefvar variable is highly collinear with the hedge variables, making 
coefficient estimates of these variables unreliable.  
11 This statistic equals -2ln (L)+2k where k is the number of parameters being estimated and L is the log likelihood.  
Smaller values indicate that a model explains the data better (less information is lost in fitting the model to the data) 
than larger values. 14 
 
undefined; that is, if EURhedge is equal to 1, it must be something other than a euro zone 
country. In other words, while the hedge variables alone appear to have explanatory power, this 
is due to a correlation with the exchange rate regimes. Indeed, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
from the hedge variables decline significantly in specifications that also introduce the exchange 
rate regime dummy variables. The variables that capture strategic behavior by importers and 
exporters are the next most important determinants of invoicing choices of exporters, with the 
effects on explaining invoice currency selection dominating the effects of terms directly 
associated with exchange rate variability of currencies and intensity of  commodity input use.  
Exports from the United States are heavily invoiced in USD. The strategic variables that 
are the largest contributors to deviations from this structure are Importsharet
i,e and Top5ind
i, 
followed distantly by the Refcon
i and Walrascon
i variables. The identification is coming from the 
fact that large invoices are more likely to be invoiced in CAD, and less likely to be invoiced in 
any other currency. The commodity intensity of production, variability of bilateral exchange 
rates, and hedging motives contribute very little to deviations from USD use in invoicing exports 
to Canada.   
 
4. The standard theoretical drivers of invoicing with multiple currencies 
 
Our empirical results are consistent with standards theoretical models of the invoicing 
choice of individual firms, as well as the aggregate invoicing shares. In this section, we briefly 
review some of these insights in the simple model presented by Goldberg and Tille (2008). For 
brevity we focus on the main elements, with more detailed exposition provided in the appendix. 
The section concludes by showing the inability of this model to generate the observed link 
between transaction size and invoicing.  
 
4.1. A simple model 
 
Consider an exporter, located in country e, which sells to customers in the destination 
country d. The market is characterized by monopolistic competition, and the demand faced by 
the exporter is inversely related to the price of her specific brand relative to the other brands sold 
in the market, with a constant price elasticity of demand . Production relies on a technology 
with decreasing returns to scale, implying a larger marginal cost for higher output. 15 
 
The exporter sets a price before exchange rates are realized. The price is set in currency k, 
which is a basket of the exporter’s currency e, the customer’s currency d, and a third vehicle 
currency v. The exporter’s optimization proceeds in two steps, first choosing the composition of 
the invoicing basket k, and then setting the price that is set in that basket. 
As in Goldberg and Tille (2008), the solution of the model proceeds backwards. We first 
solve for the optimal preset price taking the invoicing currency k as given. The exporter’s 
expected profits at that price are then written as a quadratic log expansion around a steady state. 
Intuitively, the invoicing choice determines the exporter’s exposure to exchange rate movements, 
as well as the correlation of her her revenue and costs. For instance, the destination currency d 
offers hedging benefits if it appreciates in the states of nature where the exporter faces high 
wages. Setting the price in currency d then implies that the unit revenue, in the exporter’s 
currency e, increases precisely when costs are high. The invoicing choice is then similar to a 
portfolio choice, balancing exposures to risk and the hedging properties of various currencies. 
These aspects are reflected in the variances and covariances between the various variables, and 
capturing these requires a quadratic expansion of the exporter’s profits. 
We denote the share of currency d in the invoicing basket of exporter e by 
d
d e,  . Similarly, 
the share of currency v in the basket is 
v
d e,  . Each share is between zero and one, and the residual 






d e , , , 1       . For instance, the case of “producer 
currency pricing” where the price is set in currency e and the customer bears all the exchange 
rate risk corresponds to 
e
d e,   = 1, 
d
d e,   = 
v
d e,   = 0. The case of “local currency pricing” where the 
price is set in currency d and the exporter bears all the exchange rate risk corresponds to 
e
d e,   = 
0, 
d
d e,   = 1, 
v
d e,   = 0. We denote the shares of the various currencies in the price index over all 
the brands sold in country d in a similar way. Specifically, 
d
d   is the share of the index that is set 
in currency d, and 
v
d   is the share set in currency v. 
In this setting, the optimal invoicing choice of the exporter in country e is given by: 








d e s m s m , ,                  
where  0,1] [    is a coefficient that is higher the more demand is price-sensitive and the more 
the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.  d e m ,  reflects the exogenous drivers 16 
 
of production costs, namely wages as well as demand, as a higher demand is associated with a 
higher marginal cost in the presence of decreasing returns to scale.  d e s ,  is the exchange rate 
between currency e and currency d, with a higher value corresponding to a depreciation of 
currency e. The  terms in (1) reflect the co-movements between costs and exchange rates. 
Specifically, a positive value of  ) ( , , d e d e s m ,   indicates that marginal costs are high when 
currency e is weak relative to currency d.
12 
The invoicing choice in (1) is driven by two factors. First, the exporter chooses an 
invoicing basket that is close to the one chosen by her competitors, i.e. sets her shares 
d
d e,  , 
v
d e,   
in line with the aggregate shares 
d
d  , 
v
d  . Intuitively, the exporter wants to stabilize her output by 
keeping her price (expressed in customer’s currency) close to that of her competitors. This 
“coalescing” motive, captured by the first term on the right-hand side of (1), is more relevant 
when demand is sensitive to movements in relative prices and when fluctuations in demand 
affect marginal costs (i.e.  is large). Second, the exporter invoices in currencies that offer 
hedging benefits, i.e. that appreciate when her marginal cost is high. This “hedging” motive is 
captured by the second term on the right-hand side of (1). 
The aggregate role of currencies in the market of country d, captured by the  terms, 
reflects the invoicing shares of specific firms (1), as well as the market shares of firms from 
different countries. These include local firms, which we assume invoice solely in currency d.  
 
4.2. Empirical implications 
 
The aggregate invoicing shares ’s consist of the exporter-specific invoicing shares ’s 
and the market shares of producers from various countries in the destination market, including 
local firms. The joint solution for the ’s and ’s combines (1) and the various market shares. 
For brevity we focus on the intuition behind the impact of several prominent exogenous drivers. 
The first driver is the market share of various countries. The lower the share of foreign 
countries, the higher is the role of currency d in the invoicing. Intuitively, local firms invoice in 
currency d. A higher share of local firm then directly reduces the role of currency d. This is 
compounded by an indirect effect, as foreign firms increase their use of currency d to keep their 
                                                           
12 Specifically, the ’s are the coefficient of a regression of  d e m ,  on the two exchange rates. This relationship was 
the concept underlying construction of the hedge variables of section 3. 17 
 
prices in line with that of local firms. That indirect effect is stronger when the coalescing motive 
is more pronounced. 
Conversely, a reduction of the share of local firms shifts invoicing away from currency d. 
We can also show that the invoicing shifts mostly to the other currencies that account for a 
relatively large share to start with. To sum up, we get the following implications: 
Implication 1: A higher market share for an exporting country reduces the use of the 
destination currency. This effect is larger in sectors with a strong coalescing motive and 
a large share of imports.
13 
This implication is supported by the evidence provided in Section 3, that exporters’ from 
countries with a large market share in the industry are more likely to use the PCP option at the 
expense of the LCP option.  
A second driver of invoicing is the use of imported inputs.
14 If firms in country e import 
inputs that are price in currency v, this tilts their invoicing towards currency v. Intuitively, this 
tilt reflects the hedging motive in (1). An appreciation of currency v raises the cost of inputs, in 
currency  e, for these firms. Invoicing in currency v insures that their income in their own 
currency also increases, and thus offers a hedge against fluctuations in marginal costs. In the 
presence of a coalescing motive, this also shifts the invoicing of other firms even when their 
costs are not directly exposed to the exchange rate, as they want to keep their own price in line 
with that of firms from country e. In short, we get the following implications: 
Implication 2: When costs in an exporting country 1 are more exposed to the exchange 
rate with another country 2, the invoicing of all exporters shifts away from the currency 
of country 1 towards the currency of country 2. 
Our empirical results support this implication. All else equal, exporters in sectors with a 
high use of commodity inputs, which are predominantly invoiced in USD, are more likely to 
invoice their exports in USD than in their own currency or in the CAD.  
The invoicing choice of exporters also reflects macroeconomic volatility. The currency of 
a country characterized by large shocks, owing for instance to a weak monetary policy, is 
associated with larger exchange rate movements than other currencies. This volatility reduces its 
                                                           
13 This aspect is discussed by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005). 
14 See for instance Novy (2006). 18 
 
attractiveness as an invoicing currency. Similarly, the currencies of countries with stable 
fundamentals are more attractive, as stressed by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004).  
Implication 3: More volatile macroeconomic factors in a country shift the invoicing 
away from its currency and towards the other currencies, especially towards the 
currencies of countries with more stable fundamentals. 
This is confirmed by our empirical evidence that countries with more volatile exchange 
rates vis-à-vis the CAD, reflecting more volatile domestic macroeconomic conditions, are less 
likely to use the PCP option for their exports. 
Exchange rate regimes also affect the invoicing choice. If a country e stabilizes its 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the destination currency, it reduces the attractiveness of that currency in 
terms of hedging. As a result, invoicing shifts away from currency d towards currency e. 
Implication 4: A reduction of exchange rate volatility by an exporting country vis-à-vis 
the destination raises the share of its currency in invoicing at the expense of the 
destination currency. 
The evidence supports this implication, with exporters from countries with a peg to the 
USD being more likely to use that currency than their own or the CAD. 
 
4.3. The role of transaction size 
 
The model described in the previous section does not consider different transaction sizes. 
We can easily introduce that aspect in the model however. Consider that the exporter in country 
e sells to different customers in country d, with different customers indexed by  I i , where I is 
the set of all customers. The demand from customer i,  ) (z C
i
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d e  is the preset component of the price,  ) ( , i k e S  is the exchange rate between currency 
e and currency k(i),  d P  is the price index of all brands in the destination market, in currency d, 
and 
i
d C  is the customer’s overall demand for all brands. We allow for the invoicing currency 
) (i k to differ across customers. Specifically, the invoicing shares in the destination currency d 19 
 












d e  can 
differ across customers.  
Customers only differ through the size of their consumption in the steady state, denoted by 
i
d C . They share the same price-elasticity of demand, and ex-post their overall demands fluctuate 
by the same percentage amount:  d
i
d c c  , with lower case letters denoting logs. 
We introduce a link between the various customers through the production technology. 
Specifically, the exporter uses a technology with decreasing returns to scale in the total 
production: 
(3)   
   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,
1 1




     
where  1 0   . The scaling of technology (3) by the steady state level of overall demand 
simplifies the algebra. From this specification one may expect that the exporter treats different 
customers differently. For instance, the exporter could choose to make more use of currency d 
for large customers as fluctuations in their demands lead to large movements in the marginal cost 
of production. However, we show that this is not the case, with a detailed description provided in 
the appendix. 
The maximization of expected profits (expressed as a quadratic log expansion around the 
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d C C /   is the share of customer i in total steady state consumption. Taking 
weighted averages of these conditions across customers, we show that the average invoicing 
shares are identical to (1): 
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The first-order conditions (4) then imply that the invoicing shares are the same for all customers, 
regardless of size. Allowing for different customer sizes and an interaction through the cost of 
production therefore does not give rise to differential invoicing choice across customers in the 
simple model. 
 
5. A bargaining view of invoicing 
 
The previous section shows that the standard model does not account for the link between 
transaction size and invoicing that is found in the data. Generating this empirical pattern requires 
extending the model. While one can think of many ways of extending the model, we focus on 
relaxing the assumption of a unilateral invoicing decision by the exporter. In the simple model, 
customers play no role in the invoicing decision, and simply provide exporters with a demand 
schedule and let them choose the invoicing. Such an approach is not consistent with evidence 
that invoicing is set through a bargaining between firms and customers, as shown by Friberg and 
Wilander (2008). Allowing for exporters and customers to jointly determine invoicing is thus 
more empirically realistic, and we show that it allows for a link between transaction size and 
invoicing. This section develops a setting where invoicing is set through bargaining between 
consumers and firms. While more empirically appealing, this alternative setup substantially 
raises the degree of complexity of the analysis. We therefore focus on the problem of an 
individual exporter, and abstract from the aggregate invoicing shares. 
The essence of our results is as follows. We assume that invoicing is set through a 
bargaining over the splitting of exporters’ and customers’ surpluses, with exogenous bargaining 
weights. We consider that exporters’ are risk averse, which implies first that they have some 
preference for invoicing in their own currency, but also – and more importantly – that failing to 
sell to large customers raises their marginal utility of income. Exporters then have an incentive to 
be more accommodative to the needs of larger customers, which entails more use of the 
destination currency as this limits the customers’ exchange rate exposure. Our model generates a 
larger use of the destination currency for sales to large customers. 
Our model also implies that the impact of size on invoicing is most pronounced when the 
exogenous bargaining share of the customer is small. Intuitively, a customer with substantial 
bargaining power can directly tilt the invoicing towards her preference. By contrast, a customer 
with limited power cannot directly push for her preferred invoicing, but can do so indirectly by 21 
 
presenting the exporter with an unpalatable outside option should the bargaining fail. In other 
words, the power of the customer takes the forms of the formal bargaining weight and of her 
size, with the latter being most useful when the former is limited. 
While our model generates the pattern observed in the data, it should be seen as one way to 
do so among several potential modeling approaches. We view our contribution as a step towards 
bringing bargaining into invoicing models, while recognizing that a range of alternatives can 
likewise be explored.
15 In designing our extension to the simple model, we aim to keep as close 
as possible to that model, and have the simple model be a particular case of our more general 
setting. We also deliberately choose not to allow for exogenous difference in the interaction 
between exporters and customers depending on size. For instance, one may consider that large 
customers have stronger direct bargaining weights, or that bargaining only takes place with such 
customers but not with smaller ones. While such settings can be plausible, they appear to us as 
being too close to “assuming our answers” and we opt not to allow for such features.  
 
5.1. Consumer surplus 
 
We consider sales towards several customers indexed by i, with the demand given by (2). 
As in the previous sub-section, customers only differ through the size of their steady state 
consumption, and ex-post overall demands fluctuate in step:  d
i
d c c  . Customer i gets concave 
utility from her consumption of brand z, which generates a preference for an invoicing currency 
that stabilizes consumption. The utility takes a standard CRRA form: 
(5)  0               ;           ] / ) ( [ ) 1 ( ) (
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  
The inclusion of 
i
d C  in (5) ensures that the size of the consumer does not affect its utility. Our 
specification of a utility defined at the level of each brand, instead of over a complete basket of 
brands, simplifies the analysis by shutting down spillovers across the demands for different 
brands. In our analysis, we focus on the case of  1  d   which is empirically more relevant. 
The utility (5) is obtained only if the exporter and the customer reach an agreement in their 
bargaining over invoicing. Should they fail to do so, the alternative utility for the customer is 
                                                           
15 For instance, one could consider a setting with increasing returns to scale where large customers are valued as 
they lower production costs for all sales. 22 
 
equivalent to a consumption equal to a fraction  1 
i
d   of 
i
d C . The surplus that the customer 
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5.2. Producer surplus 
 
The exporter of brand z uses a technology with decreasing returns to scale: 
(7)    1 0        ;       ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,
1 1   
   







For simplicity, we assume that there are different production lines for different customers, so that 
the demand by a customer does not affect the marginal costs of producing for other customers. 
Our specification thus differs from (3). We opt for this specification for simplicity, as our earlier 
analysis shows that linkages through cost do not give raise to differentiated invoicing. The 
technology is also scaled by the level of steady state demand, which ensures that steady state 
marginal costs and prices are equalized across customers. The profits that the exporter gets from 




d e  . We assume that the exporter’s utility of her profits 
takes a CRRA form: 
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where J is the set of customers to whom the exporter can sell brand z. Our exposition will focus 
on the case of  1  e  . 
If the firm fails to reach an agreement with customer i she will only sell to the other 
customers in the set I.
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The impact of profits on the exporter’s marginal utility is an important difference from usual 
models in which the discount factor is not influenced by the pricing and invoicing decisions. In 
                                                           
16 In equilibrium the firm sells to all customers. We can therefore evaluate the firm’s outside option in its bargaining 
with a specific customer as the utility from sales to all other customers. 23 
 
particular, it implies that the exporter’s marginal utility of income is higher when negotiating 
with a larger customer, making her more willing to accommodate the customer’s preferences.  












d e  . We consider that these are set in two stages. First, invoicing is set through a 
bargaining between the exporter and the consumer. Second, the exporter sets the price taking the 
invoicing and demand (2) as given. The first step is forward-looking and takes the conditional 
pricing choice of the second step into account. 
This assumption that invoicing is set through a bargaining process, but prices are not, 
warrants further discussion. It differs from the standard approach in bargaining models where 
agents first maximize the joint surplus and then split this surplus between them. While following 
the latter approach has obvious appeal, it does not allow us (to our knowledge) to obtain the case 
of unilateral invoicing and pricing as a particular case of the more general solution. By contrast, 
limiting bargaining to the invoicing shares and letting exporters set the price unilaterally 
encompasses the simpler model developed in section 4 as a particular case. We thus opted for 
that limited inclusion of invoicing in order to remain as close as possible to the standard setting. 
Our choice of a setting encompassing the standard one is done solely to keep the focus on 
bargaining over invoicing, and should not be interpreting as a judgment against broader 
bargaining models. Richer inclusions of bargaining in the context of invoice currency choice are 








d e  to maximize (8). This leads to a standard expression where the 
expected discounted marginal revenue is a markup over the expected discounted marginal cost. 
The price is then affected by the ex-post co-movements between the variables of the model, a 
feature akin to a risk premium. An additional complication over our earlier model is that the 
discount factor used in setting the price is itself a function of the profits. The preset price can be 
written as a quadratic expansion around the steady state: 
















































d e disc  is the discount factor that is inversely relative to denoting the linear 
component of profits,  d e,  : 
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where  d d d e d e c p s z    ] [ , ,  . (10) shows that altering the invoicing shares impacts the exposure 
of the exporter to fluctuations in exchange rates and marginal costs, and leads her to alter the 
level at which she sets the prices. The utility of the exporter (8) can also be expressed as a 




In the first step of the solution, the exporter and the customer set the invoicing shares to 
maximize the following measure of joint surplus that combines (6) and (9): 
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where  ] 1 , 0 [    reflects the relative bargaining power of the exporter. We do not allow for this 
power to differ depending on the customer size, as this would be too immediate a way to 
generate a link between size and invoicing. The surpluses (6) and (9) can be written as quadratic 
approximations around the steady state, which shows that the gap between each surplus and its 
steady-state value reflects expected cross products of the deviations of the exchange rates, wages 
and consumption from steady state values. The joint surplus (11) can be written in a similar 
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d e   following similar steps. The derivative of 
the joint surplus (11) with respect to the invoicing share takes the form (for brevity we abstract 














































d D  is an increasing function of customer size measured by her steady-state share 
of overall consumption, 
i
d  , and is a decreasing function of the exporter’s bargaining power, . 
Both derivatives on the right-hand side of (12) are decreasing linear functions of the invoicing 




d e  . 
The optimal invoicing shares are obtained by setting (12) and the corresponding condition 
with respect to the share of the vehicle currency to zero. The invoicing shares are then: 
(13)  ) , ( ) , ( , ,
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where the  terms are regressions coefficients defined in the same way as in (1), and the ’s are 
coefficients. 
The unilateral invoicing assumption of the standard model corresponds to the situation 
where the exporter holds the entire bargaining power ( = 1). In that case  0 
i
d D  in (12) and the 
invoicing shares (13)-(14) are identical to (1). Under this allocation, the marginal impact of the 
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The customer’s surplus is affected by the level of the preset price and the ex-post 
volatility of consumption. Welfare is reduced when the exporter sets a higher price (10), an 
aspect captured by the  1  e   terms in (15). Increasing the invoicing share of the destination 
currency boosts the exporter’s exposure to exchange rate volatility, inducing her to charge a 
higher price. In addition, lower demand ( 0  d c ) reduces the exporters’ profits and increases her 
discount factor. If the exporter’s currency appreciates when demand is low ( 0 ,  d e ds Ec ), raising 
the invoicing share of the destination currency adversely affects her as she faces a low revenue in 
her currency at the same time that demand is low. This induces her to set a higher price. Finally, 26 
 
high wages ( 0  e w ) lower profits and increase the discount factor. If the exporter’s currency 
depreciates when wages are high ( 0 ,  d e es Ew ), raising the invoicing share of the destination 
currency generates a favorable hedge against these costs as the exporter receives more in terms 
of her own currency when wages are high. This induces her to reduce her price. 
The customer’s surplus is also lowered when demand is volatile, either because the 
relative price of the brand is volatile or because aggregate demand fluctuates. This dimension is 
captured by the  1  d   terms in (15). Increasing the invoicing share of the customer’s currency 
above the unilateral allocation reduces the volatility of the exporter’s brand relative price, which 
benefits the customer. In addition, the sensitivity of the customer’s surplus to the invoicing share 
is lower when the customer’s currency is already used substantially in the unilateral invoicing. 
This is the case if for instance this currency offers a good hedge against fluctuations in wages 
(0 ,  d e es Ew ). Increasing the use of the destination currency then yields only a moderate gain for 
the customer. Finally, a higher use of the destination currency limits the impact of fluctuations in 
demand,  d c , on the customer’s surplus, if the exporter’s currency depreciates when demand is 
high ( 0 ,  d e ds Ec ). Intuitively, invoicing in the exporter’s currency then lowers the relative price 
of her good when demand is already high, thereby magnifying demand volatility. 
The customer’s surplus then balances the impact on the preset price with that on demand 
volatility. The second aspect dominates if the customer is sufficiently more risk averse than the 
exporter, i.e.  ) 1 ( ) 1 (    e d    . (15) also shows that a use of the customer’s currency in 
invoicing above its share in the unilateral outcome is not necessarily in the customer’s interest, as 
the burden this places on the exporter leads her to set prices at a higher level. 
We focus on the case where (15) is positive, so that increasing the invoicing share of 
currency  d from its value under unilateral invoicing benefits the customer. The unilateral 
















d e SC  . We can show that 
the second derivatives of the exporter’s and consumer’s surpluses (64) and (9) are negative. It 
follows that the invoicing under a bilateral bargaining process ( < 1) entails a larger share of the 
customer’s currency than the unilateral invoicing. The bilateral invoicing allocation is then 
















d e SC  . Our results can be summarized by 
the following implication: 27 
 
Implication 5: The optimal invoicing under bargaining is likely to call for a larger use 
of the destination currency than under a unilateral choice by the exporter. 
5.5. Invoicing and consumer size 
 
The role of the consumer size is derived by setting (12) to zero, and differentiating the 
resulting expression with respect to the invoicing share and the size of demand. Abstracting from 
































d e SC   at the bargained allocation, both sides of (16) are positive. The share of 







d e d d   .  
Intuitively, the marginal value of exporter’s profits is higher when she fails to reach an 
agreement with a large customer than when she fails to do so with a smaller one. When 
bargaining with a large customer, the firm is more amenable to moving the use of the local 
currency beyond the level that it would unilaterally choose. 
The central element of our result is not just the fact that failing to reach an agreement with 
a large customer entails substantial foregone profits, but that the marginal value of these profits 
is larger. If the firm is risk-neutral ( 0  e  ) then the function H in (16) is always equal to one 
and its derivative is zero, implying that customer size has no impact on the outcome of the 
bargaining process. 
The impact of customer’s size on the invoicing decision depends on the value of the 
derivative of the customer’s surplus with respect to the invoicing share. If the bargaining 
allocation is substantially tilted towards the customer’s preferences, because of a limited 









d e SC    , is small as the bargaining process brings the customer close to her 
preferred invoicing allocation. Going beyond the bargained allocation then entails only a limited 
gain for the customer. The left hand side of (16) is then small and customer’s size has little 
impact. Intuitively, being a large customer offers little additional benefit when the customer 
already has a substantial role in the bargaining process. By contrast, only large customers can tilt 28 
 
the invoicing allocation in their favor when their direct bargaining weight is limited. Our analysis 
can be summarized in the following implication: 
Implication 6: Under a bargaining determination of invoicing, the use of the destination 
currency is more pronounced for larger customers. This is especially the case when the 
bargaining allocation is close to the unilateral one. 
This implication is in line with our empirical evidence that transaction in the top 5
th 
percentile of a specific industry are more likely to be invoiced in the destination currency. It is 
also consistent with the finding that the impact of transaction size on invoicing is most 
pronounced in industries where the exporter is from a country with a large market share, a proxy 
for her bargaining power. 
5.6. Discussion 
Our model shows that moving the choice of invoicing from a unilateral decision by a firm 
to a bargaining process substantially alters the results. First, it leads to a larger use of the 
destination currency. Second, the use of destination currency is more pronounced for larger sales, 
as the marginal value of profits is then high. Finally, the impact of customer’s size is larger when 
customers otherwise have little direct influence on the bargaining process. 
Our bargaining model also offers a channel through which firms in large countries are less 
likely to invoice in the currency of their consumers. In the model, for brevity we considered that 
the firm only sells to foreign consumers. The model could be extended to include domestic sales 
by the firm in its own country. A firm with a large domestic market would have a lower marginal 
utility of profits than a firm with a smaller home market, and thus be less amenable to shift its 
invoicing towards the destination currency. In addition, the firm could to have a larger 
bargaining power , which further reduces its willingness to accommodate the needs of foreign 
consumers. While we have not assessed the impact of the various drivers considered in section 2 
in our alternative model, the results are likely to be qualitatively similar. 
As discussed at the beginning of section 5, we view our model as the first step towards 
including bargaining in the invoicing process. We do not consider that this model represents the 
final stage in such a research effort for two reasons. First, we limited the bargaining to invoicing, 
and kept the pricing decision in the hands of the exporter. This choice is motivated by our desire 
to have the extended model encompass the simple one of unilateral invoicing as a particular case. 29 
 
Our setting however does not take the form of a maximization of the joint surplus, followed by a 
splitting of this surplus, which is more standard in bargaining models.
17 Developing broader 
bargaining models is clearly a promising avenue for research. Second, our approach abstracts 
from alternative channels through which invoicing could be different for large customers. One 
would be a model with increasing returns to scale where firms are more willing to accommodate 
the invoicing preferences of large customers as large sales drive production costs down. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The extensive literature on international trade invoicing is affected by two limitations that 
this paper addresses. On the empirical side, existing studies only consider aggregate data. We 
instead test a range of possible determinants of invoicing by using a new highly disaggregated 
dataset for 45 million Canadian import transactions. While the U.S. dollar is the dominant 
currency for imports from the United States, other currencies play a substantial role in imports 
from other countries, which account for nearly half of overall imports by count. We find strong 
support for a direct role of exchange rate arrangements, coalescing in a common currency, use of 
commodity inputs in production, and for the bargaining power of importers. The connection 
between transaction size and invoicing is a new aspect in the invoicing literature. We find only 
mixed support for invoicing decisions influenced by profit hedging considerations. 
On the theory side, existing studies consider that invoicing is unilaterally set by 
exporters, a feature that is not supported by survey evidence. We introduce interplay between 
customers and exporters in the selection of invoicing currencies by considering bargaining 
between the exporter and the customer. Two main results emerge. First, the bargaining solution 
calls for a larger use of the destination currency than the unilateral invoicing. Second, the use of 
the customer’s currency is more pronounced for large sales. This is especially the case when the 
direct bargaining power of exporters is high.  
Our conclusions provide a new perspective on the determinants of invoicing currency 
use, and, through this, on international policy transmission through exchange rate movements. 
For instance, a shift from a large number of relatively small imports to a handful of larger ones, 
such as large retail chains, could boost the use of the importers’ currency and thus limit the pass-
through of exchange rate movements to import prices. This link between industry concentration 
                                                           
17 See for instance Blanchard (2000) in the context of the labor market where firms and workers choose the 
employment level to maximize that overall surplus, and bargain over the wage to split the surplus. 30 
 
and pass-through has not been addressed to our knowledge, and offers an interesting 
counterpoint to the standard view in the literature that large exporters always have an advantage 
in determining pricing features. Another implication is that a shift by emerging markets away 
from dollar pegs towards floating exchange rates could lower the use of the dollar as an 
invoicing currency, as could declines in dollar use in sales of specific commodities in global 
markets . Such a reduction in the global role of the dollar could have profound implications for 
the international transmission of policy, as discussed by Goldberg and Tille (2009).  
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Animal Products  68.2  5.0  9.9  4.6  3.0  9.3  1.0 
Vegetable Products  60.6  7.9  7.5  5.9  3.8  14.3  3.1 
Foodstuffs  61.7  11.8  7.8  3.5  1.6  13.5  3.2 
Mineral Products  84.0  4.6  1.5  3.2  0.7  6.1  1.5 
Chemicals  70.3  11.5  2.8  3.3  0.4  11.6  9.8 
Plastics/Rubbers  63.7  11.2  7.8  3.3  0.9  13.2  7.0 
Leather/Furs/Hides  44.2  14.3  13.1  9.3  1.9  17.2  1.0 
Wood Products  66.3  9.8  8.2  4.7  1.0  9.9  7.2 
Textiles  42.8  13.6  14.6  9.2  1.4  18.4  9.3 
Footwear/Headgear  39.7  12.9  18.2  15.1  1.9  12.1  1.2 
Stone/Glass  52.9  13.3  9.7  6.8  1.7  15.7  4.6 
Metals  61.7  11.4  7.3  4.6  0.8  14.2  13.2 
Machinery/Electrical  56.3  13.4  8.8  3.5  0.9  17.1  23.2 
Transportation  65.4  10.3  5.9  3.2  0.8  14.3  2.8 
Miscellaneous  54.5  11.6  10.7  6.5  0.5  16.2  10.9 
Service  67.2  8.9  7.1  2.9  0.7  13.1  0.8 

















Animal Products  62.3  5.5  8.3  7.9  4.2  11.8  0.8 
Vegetable Products  69.6  5.5  3.7  2.8  6.2  12.2  1.9 
Foodstuffs  58.6  17.7  4.0  1.9  4.9  12.8  3.0 
Mineral Products  26.9  4.6  0.3  0.4  1.3  66.5  10.9 
Chemicals  59.0  19.3  1.3  2.0  1.2  17.2  7.8 
Plastics/Rubbers  76.9  5.1  5.4  6.0  0.4  6.1  4.7 
Leather/Furs/Hides  14.4  15.9  5.3  53.2  3.0  8.2  0.4 
Wood Products  79.4  7.2  2.3  6.0  1.6  3.5  3.4 
Textiles  32.2  6.7  11.4  33.2  0.9  15.6  2.7 
Footwear/Headgear  4.9  11.0  11.9  64.8  3.9  3.6  0.5 
Stone/Glass  55.5  8.7  2.7  8.0  11.3  13.8  2.2 
Metals  64.5  7.6  4.9  9.4  3.7  9.8  6.8 
Machinery/Electrical  54.5  7.9  9.0  11.1  0.3  17.2  25.7 
Transportation  68.9  9.1  4.2  0.8  0.9  16.0  21.0 
Miscellaneous  47.3  9.7  4.6  22.2  0.2  15.9  6.2 
Service  59.6  24.0  0.7  0.9  0.1  14.7  2.0 

























Animal Products  9,422  321,806  2.1  4.2  3,861  457,343  5.7  16.2 
Vegetable Products  4,718  381,710  2.3  3.5  2,335  221,396  5.7  9.3 
Foodstuffs  12,046  328,670  3.3  17.2  2,733  326,451  6.0  24.5 
Mineral Products  4,882  694,664  2.5  6.9  764  27,059,727  5.2  7.0 
Chemicals  2,641  257,238  3.5  11.7  1,462  262,860  6.6  19.3 
Plastics/Rubbers  5,781  358,761  2.7  7.5  1,289  187,073  3.3  13.9 
Leather/Furs/Hides  507  44,148  3.3  7.2  1,309  284,232  3.4  10.3 
Wood Products  2,573  230,359  2.7  12.9  539  150,689  4.1  13.5 
Textiles  802  120,959  3.4  5.5  1,030  180,142  4.0  10.7 
Footwear/Headgear  246  25,006  4.3  8.7  1,014  375,026  4.7  7.7 
Stone/Glass  2,024  191,971  3.1  5.9  1,307  183,740  4.0  8.7 
Metals  2,577  258,173  2.9  5.4  925  211,080  3.7  13.2 
Machinery/Electrical  5,070  472,596  2.7  6.6  2,861  560,843  3.3  10.9 
Transportation  20,279  2,726,504  2.3  9.2  6,071  1,921,510  2.7  13.4 
Miscellaneous  2,291  259,831  3.1  7.9  1,937  277,942  3.8  13.2 




   1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   LCP  PCP  LCP  PCP  LCP  PCP LCP PCP LCP PCP LCP PCP  LCP PCP LCP PCP LCP PCP LCP PCP 
Intercept ‐ 2.77* ‐ 1.46* ‐ 2.85* ‐ 1.45* ‐ 2.70* ‐1.35* ‐2.76* ‐1.38* ‐2.73* ‐1.02* ‐2.66* ‐0.94* ‐ 2.83* ‐2.00* ‐2.77* ‐1.33* ‐2.57* ‐0.31** ‐2.78* ‐1.41* 
   [0.05]  [0.10]  [0.05]  [0.10]  [0.04] [0.09] [0.05] [0.10] [0.06] [0.16] [0.05] [0.08]  [0.06] [0.10] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06] [0.15] [0.05] [0.13] 
Refcon     0.52* ‐ 0.10*     0.47* ‐0.14* 0.47* ‐0.17* 
       [0.00]  [0.00]     [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Walrascon    0.25* ‐ 0.22*     0.18* ‐0.26* 0.24* ‐0.09* 
       [0.01]  [0.01]     [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Importshare       ‐ 8.73* ‐3.19*  ‐ 8.66* ‐3.22* ‐7.57* 0.55* 
         [0.14] [0.04]   [0.14] [0.05] [0.15] [0.04] 
Top5ind       1.51* ‐0.03**   1.50* ‐0.03** 1.55* 0.05* 
         [0.01] [0.01]   [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Top5ind*       3.61* ‐4.19*   3.76* ‐4.24* 3.41* ‐3.15* 
importshare       [0.12] [0.13]   [0.12] [0.13] [0.12] [0.07] 
Intensity        ‐ 0.15* ‐0.80*  ‐ 0.20* ‐0.97* ‐1.00* ‐1.76* 
          [0.03] [0.03]   [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] 
Coefvar        ‐ 1.03 ‐10.11**  ‐ 1.3 ‐11.27** ‐0.89** ‐7.48** 
          [0.89] [3.71]   [0.85] [3.55] [0.41] [1.92] 
USDhedge       0.03 ‐0.37*  0.03 ‐0.36* 0.01 ‐0.23* 
          [0.04] [0.09]  [0.04] [0.09] [0.02] [0.04] 
EURhedge       ‐ 0.28* ‐1.42* ‐ 0.28* ‐1.45* 0.04 ‐0.14** 
          [0.04] [0.09]  [0.04] [0.09] [0.02] [0.06] 
CADhedge       ‐ 0.1 ‐0.46* ‐ 0.11** ‐0.53* 0.05** 0.01 
          [0.05] [0.09]  [0.05] [0.09] [0.02] [0.03] 
Dollarpeg          ‐ 0.43* ‐1.19* ‐0.22* ‐1.36* 
            [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] 
Europeg          0.43* 1.54* 0.44* 1.46* 
            [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  16,905,286  16,905,286  16,905,286 16,905,286 16,905,286 16,905,286  16,905,286 16,905,286 16,905,286 16,905,286 




   1  2  3 4 5 6  7 8 9
   LCP  VCP  LCP  VCP  LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP  VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP
Intercept ‐ 3.39* ‐ 5.32* ‐ 3.38* ‐ 5.14* ‐ 3.15* ‐4.75* ‐3.36* ‐5.31* ‐3.32* ‐6.09* ‐3.43 ‐ 5.32** ‐3.14* ‐4.77* ‐6.54 ‐6.28** ‐6.29* ‐6.57
   [0.02]  [0.16]  [0.02]  [0.15]  [0.03] [0.13] [0.02] [0.15] [0.03] [0.10] [0.52]  [1.53] [0.03] [0.14] [5.80] [1.72] [0.37] [198.90]
Refcon     ‐ 0.01 ‐ 1.21*   0.05* ‐1.15* 0.05* ‐1.16*
       [0.01]  [0.03]   [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.04]
Walrascon    ‐ 0.22* ‐ 2.24*   ‐ 0.20* ‐2.23* ‐0.19* ‐2.28*
       [0.01]  [0.10]   [0.01] [0.10] [0.01] [0.10]
Importshare       ‐ 0.61* ‐0.91*  ‐ 0.63* ‐0.57* ‐0.62* ‐0.59*
         [0.03] [0.02]   [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Top5ind       1.04* ‐1.15*   1.04* ‐1.12* 1.05* ‐1.13*
         [0.02] [0.11]   [0.02] [0.11] [0.02] [0.11]
Top5ind*       0.34* ‐1.11*   0.33* ‐1.18* 0.32* ‐1.13*
importshare       [0.03] [0.19]   [0.03] [0.20] [0.03] [0.11]
Intensity       ‐ 0.30* ‐0.13**  ‐ 0.30* ‐0.13** ‐0.18* 0.79*
         [0.03] [0.06]   [0.03] [0.06] [0.02] [0.07]
Coefvar       ‐ 1.62** 17.32*   61.76 ‐43.25 61.28* ‐48.6
         [0.48] [1.88]   [33.83] [7.32] [3912.90] 
EURhedge      0.01  0.35 ‐0.84 4.12* ‐0.85* 5.17
           [1.62] [0.43] [0.10] [53.66]
CADhedge      0.07 ‐ 0.32 1.59 1.79** 1.60* 2.72
           [1.59] [0.84] [0.18] [96.59]
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Observations  24,615,469  24,615,469  24,615,469 24,615,469 24,615,469 24,615,469 24,615,469 24,615,469 24,615,469






Model  AIC  Model  AIC 
All variables  19,223,300 All variables  8,432,849
Pegs  19,529,769 Industry + Bargaining  8,434,003
Hedges  20,945,316 Bargaining (Importshare/Top5ind)  8,455,446
Industry + Bargaining  21,026,254 Industry (Ref/Walras)  8,553,275
Bargaining (Importshare/Top5ind)  21,055,445 Coefvar  8,576,619
Coefvar  21,337,453 Hedges  8,576,621
Industry (Ref/Walras)  21,375,939 Intensity  8,577,018
Intensity  21,399,071 Time FE only  8,577,390
Time FE only  21,406,515 Intercept only  8,586,852





















                            







Figure 3. Producer, Local and Vehicle Currency Pricing in Canadian Import Transactions 
 
                            
                          Appendix: Constructing the hedging variable 
As exposited in Goldberg and Tille (2008), the hedging motive for invoice currency selection 
reflects the covariances between exchange rates and producer marginal costs 
  ,  and  , ed ed ed ev ms ms  . The idea is that the producer should choose an invoicing 
currency so that revenues are highest when costs are highest, with this positive correlation 
helping to hedge producer profitability. Producer marginal costs are modeled as 
  1/ ed e d mw c      where  e w is the wage or producer price index representing the unit 
marginal cost of the exporter and  d c is the sensitivity of marginal costs to changes in demand, 
representing the shape of the production frontier.
18 We proxy for exporter marginal costs in 
each country by constructing quarterly values for  ed m , where the cost of inputs  e w  are the 
logs nominal producer price indices in exporter’s currency, is set at 0.65, and  d c  is the log 
of real consumption in Canada as the export destination market “d”. The PPI values are more 
desirable than pure wages since they internalize the cost of imported inputs that can influence 
hedging decisions. (Even more desirable would be industry-specific production costs).  ev s  is 
in units of currency e per unit of currency v so an increase is a depreciation of currency e.    
Ideally, surprises in consumption strength and PPI would be correlated with surprise 
depreciations of the exporter currency to extract a preferred hedge. We do not have data 
coverage to run this type of experiment. Instead, we compute each  ed m  and run a rolling 
correlation with three bilateral exchange rates, which are vis-à-vis dollars, euros, and CAD, 
over 8 prior quarters of data. A desirable hedging currency has a positive correlation and a 
higher correlation than the two alternative currencies.  If no currencies have recent positive 
correlations with the  ed m , then all hedge dummies are given a zero value at a particular date.  
Constructing each of these variables relied on careful empirical work. However, 
despite this care, the weakest construction is likely to be for the hedging variables USDhedge, 
CADhedge and EURhedge. Intuitively, the hedging motive argues that the currency used for 
                                                           
18 For the approximately 50 countries covered as exporters to Canada we have wage data and producer price 
index data.  For the 26 countries across which both wage and PPI data are available, these series tend to be 
highly correlated in most cases except  for France and Japan, and positively but less strongly correlated for parts 
of Asia.  Wage data were nominal and in the home currency from the ILO : http://laborsta.ilo.org/ .  PPI data are 
from the IMF’s IFS database. 
 
   40
invoicing should be the currency which generates unexpected fluctuations in revenue that 
offset unexpected shocks to marginal costs, stemming from either wages or the strength of 
demand. If, for instance, an unexpected high growth in Canadian demand raises the marginal 
cost, the exporter has an incentive to invoice in a currency that tends to appreciate against his 
own in such states, thereby boosting his unit revenue. The challenge is to implement such a 
construct for our sample of 47 exporters and over the full sample period. In practice, if there is 
a period of above trend growth in an export destination market, an exporter might value for 
invoicing, via the hedging motive, a currency that has tended to appreciate over similar 
periods of economic growth. We construct rolling correlations of exporter bilateral exchange 
rates against the proxy for exporter costs over the prior 8 quarters and use the pattern of 
observed correlations in an exporter’s recent past to determine his hedging preference in 
period t. A hedging currency should appreciate (on average) when the export destination 
market has abnormally high growth, and should have a stronger positive correlation that 
would be the case if alternative currencies were used for hedging. In our data, the general 
trend is that the CAD is a good hedge early on in the period and late in the period. USD and 
EUR get some action in the middle. Across all countries and over the whole estimation 
period, the three currencies are about equally balanced: USD 22 percent, EUR 21 percent, 
CAD 26 percent and none 31 percent.    41
Appendix Table 1
   Percent of Observations 
Country  Frequency  By Count By Value 
Algeria  2,804  0.01 1.10 
Angola  638  0.00 0.97 
Australia  189,876  0.44 0.43 
Austria  264,842  0.61 0.32 
Belgium  283,294  0.65 0.43 
Brazil  293,295  0.67 0.74 
Chile  70,499  0.16 0.35 
China  2,086,341  4.78 7.29 
Czech Republic  166,495  0.38 0.07 
Denmark  248,269  0.57 0.35 
Finland  161,066  0.37 0.26 
France  848,044  1.94 2.44 
Germany  1,366,460  3.13 2.69 
Hong Kong  379,889  0.87 0.16 
Hungary  121,353  0.28 0.06 
India  638,209  1.46 0.44 
Indonesia  305,158  0.70 0.24 
Iraq  239  0.00 0.45 
Ireland  137,397  0.31 0.53 
Israel  211,370  0.48 0.22 
Italy  1,039,771  2.38 1.31 
Japan  1,119,697  2.57 3.66 
Malaysia  290,031  0.66 0.64 
Mexico  804,077  1.84 3.67 
Netherlands  361,875  0.83 0.51 
Nigeria  5,889  0.01 0.65 
Norway  90,394  0.21 1.36 
Pakistan  133,013  0.30 0.07 
Peru  63,036  0.14 0.33 
Philippines  229,161  0.53 0.23 
Poland  155,627  0.36 0.16 
Portugal  133,610  0.31 0.10 
Russia  59,141  0.14 0.44 
Saudi Arabia  10,028  0.02 0.38 
Singapore  159,667  0.37 0.32 
South Africa  110,256  0.25 0.18 
South Korea  593,440  1.36 1.65 
Spain  336,599  0.77 0.36 
Sweden  366,043  0.84 0.54 
Switzerland  458,790  1.05 0.55 
Taiwan  970,169  2.22 0.96 
Thailand  467,332  1.07 0.52 
Turkey  226,562  0.52 0.18 
United Kingdom  1,027,244  2.35 3.34 
United States  24,654,574  56.49 54.96 
Venezuela  14,926  0.03 0.38 
Vietnam  193,860  0.44 0.15 
Total  41,850,350  95.89 97.12 
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Appendix Table 2. Coefficients of Correlation: Non-U.S. Exports to Canada 
  Dollarpeg  Europeg  Walrascon Refcon Top5ind LCP PCP VCP USDhedge  EURhedge CADhedge Intensity Coefvar Importshare
Dollarpeg  1.00      
Europeg ‐ 0.30  1.00    
Walrascon  0.00 ‐ 0.01  1.00  
Refcon ‐ 0.02  0.02 ‐ 0.05  1.00  
Top5ind  0.14 ‐ 0.05  0.01 ‐ 0.01 1.00  
LCP ‐ 0.03  0.01  0.01  0.04 0.10 1.00  
PCP ‐ 0.16  0.33 ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.10 1.00  
VCP  0.16 ‐ 0.31  0.01 ‐ 0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.41 ‐0.87 1.00  
USDhedge ‐ 0.27  0.11  0.00  0.01 ‐0.03 0.01 0.03 ‐0.03 1.00 
EURhedge  0.18 ‐ 0.40  0.00 ‐ 0.02 0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.14 0.13 ‐0.36  1.00
CADhedge  0.06  0.06 ‐ 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.41 ‐ 0.43 1.00
Intensity ‐ 0.07  0.04  0.08  0.04 0.00 0.00 ‐0.02 0.02 0.01 ‐ 0.02 0.00 1.00
Coefvar ‐ 0.11 ‐ 0.13  0.01  0.00 ‐0.01 0.00 ‐0.05 0.05 0.07  0.05 ‐0.16 ‐0.01 1.00
Importshare  0.47 ‐ 0.14 ‐ 0.02 ‐ 0.06 0.20 ‐0.04 ‐0.07 0.08 ‐0.12  0.07 0.04 ‐0.13 ‐0.06 1.00
 
Appendix Table 3. Coefficients of Correlation: U.S. Exports to Canada 
  Walrascon  Refcon  Top5ind  LCP PCP VCP EURhedge CADhedge  Intensity Coefvar Importshare
Walrascon  1.00      
Refcon ‐ 0.09  1.00    
Top5ind  0.00  0.01  1.00  
LCP ‐ 0.01  0.00  0.08  1.00  
PCP  0.01  0.01 ‐ 0.07 ‐ 0.92 1.00  
VCP ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.02 ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.01 ‐0.37 1.00  
EURhedge  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  
CADhedge  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 ‐0.59 1.00 
Intensity  0.14  0.05  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00
Coefvar  0.00  0.00 ‐ 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.51 ‐0.73  0.00 1.00
Importshare  0.01  0.21  0.04 ‐ 0.01 0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 0.02  0.03 ‐0.06 1.00
 